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June 6, 2011: 2380 DAYS SINCE SUIT FILED
March 11 2014: 1371 DAYS SINCE MANDATE
March 25 2014: 1357 DAYS SINCE ILLEGAL CLOSING OF CASE
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History has shown us that, on extraordinarily rare occasions, it becomes necessary for the federal government to intervene on behalf of individuals whose 14th Amendment rights to legal due process and equal protection may be violated by a state.
Michael K. Simpson
How do you know you are in court? You are facing: this!
Copyright © 2016 HEMPFLING et.al. k Volkmer et.al. CV-16-3213-PHX-ESW United States District Court NOT affiliated with the Pinal County Justice Foundation

TIMELIME

This timeline is for information purposes only. Refer to :Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 27. Motions (a)(4) "Reply to Response. Any reply to a response must be filed within 7 days after service of the response. A reply must not present matters that do not relate to the response." (Deadline for reply to Plaintiff's response was November 7, 2016.) Also take careful note of :Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. Summary Judgment (e)(3) "Failing to Properly Support or Address a Fact. If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it;"

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NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 26, 2016

FEDERAL INJUNCTION SOUGHT TO STOP VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS BY PINAL COUNTY ATTORNEY M. LANDO VOYLES, LORETTA LYNCH (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED), MARK BRNOVICH AND PINAL COUNTY JUDGES (FORMER JUDGE SOOS VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)


Apache Junction, AZ - An Apache Junction couple has filed a complaint for permanent preventive injunction to stop the refusal of the Pinal County Court to release the orders in an over five-year-old, defaulted malpractice case.

The case was improperly closed and blocked in March of 2014 without the proper use of prevailing court rules, thereby violating procedural due process. Since there are no material facts anyone can dispute, Lee & Suesie Hempfling have requested Federal Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett to declare summary judgment in the Plaintiffs' favor and order those responsible for withholding the case to release it.

The complaint names Pinal County Attorney M. Lando Voyles, Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich and United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED) in their official capacities, as the circumstances surrounding the improper closure of the case are shrouded in secrecy; making any, or all of the prosecutorial agencies responsible for seeking the closure. The Hempflings have asked the court to dismiss any prosecutorial agency found not to be involved. Although all were provided the means to remain out of the complaint. None responded. The case also names the two Pinal County Judges who conducted the trial and subsequent filings.

About the Injunction:

Hempfling et al v. Voyles et al Case #: 2:16-cv-03213 was filed on September 21, 2016 in the United States District Court, District of Arizona under 42:1983 Civil Rights Act and was served to all defendants on Monday September 26, 2016.

HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS Case #: S-1100-CV-201102200 was filed on June 6, 2011 in the Pinal County Superior Court. A judgment has been entered in the case but not served and no final orders have been issued or served. The case is in default status due to a crime or crimes having been committed in the Pinal County Court's Court of Clerk office in Florence, Arizona in 2011.

For the complaint, the legal brief and a complete review of the current Injunction and the circumstances surrounding both cases; access http://pinalcountyjustice.com


The small Harvard logo in the upper right corner of this site leads to this link.

The survey found, under Illegal Corruption in America that "Arizona is perceived to be the most corrupt state with legislative and executive branches both scoring 4". Arizona's score for Illegal Judicial corruption was a 2: "even a score of 2 is still worrying since it is the judicial branch of the government that is supposed to try and convict the corrupt officials." Even Arizona's Legal Bar (where the attorneys live) is corrupt. With all of that going against the reputation of law in Arizona would not a prudent person do a serious double take when a simple malpractice case cannot even have orders issued, within TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS of the case being finished? To most people, that just doesn't matter. So What if a civil case in Pinal County just goes away? So What if a civil case that began with the commission of a CRIME INSIDE THE COURT CLERK'S OFFICE just quietly goes away? It is that 'so what' that doesn't matter to most people. And it is that 'so what' that permits corruption to claim the state's highest honor.

Lee & Suesie Hempfling, Pro Se
Apache Junction, AZ 85120

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LEE HEMPFLING &

SUESIE HEMPFLING ,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

M. Lando VOYLES ,

BOYD T. JOHNSON.

BRADLEY M. SOOS, (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

MARK BRNOVICH,

LORETTA LYNCH (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

Defendants

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Case No.: CV-16-3213-PHX-ESW

PERMANENT
PREVENTIVE
INJUNCTION
AND
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR PERMANENT PREVENTIVE
INJUNCTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. The parties to this complaint

A: The Plaintiffs

Plaintiff No. 1

LEE HEMPFLING

Apache Junction, AZ 85120

Plaintiff No. 2

SUESIE HEMPFLING

Apache Junction, AZ 85120

B: The Defendants

Defendant No. 1

M. LANDO VOYLES; in official capacity

County Attorney

Pinal County

Florence, AZ 85132

Defendant No. 2

BOYD T. JOHNSON, Judge Retired; in official capacity

Pinal County

Superior Court Administration

Florence, AZ 85132

Defendant No. 3

BRADLEY M. SOOS, Judge Pro Tem; in official capacity (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

Pinal County

Superior Court Administration

Florence, AZ 85132

Defendant No. 4

MARK BRNOVICH; in official capacity

Attorney General of Arizona

Phoenix, AZ 85007

Defendant No. 5

LORETTA LYNCH; in official capacity (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

Attorney General of the United States

U.S. Department of Justice Building

Washington, DC 20530-0001

II. Basis for Jurisdiction

Federal Question in 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 14th Amendment Due Process Clause. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases allow a suit against any public employee who "subjects, or causes to be subjected" someone to a deprivation of federal constitutional rights. Judicial positions in this action are those who subjected Plaintiffs to 14th Amendment violations, while prosecutorial entities are those who caused or may have caused Plaintiffs to be so subjected. As a general rule, absolute judicial immunity does not bar an award of prospective injunctive relief (Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) ). "...although, prospective relief awarded against a state officer also 'implicate[s] Eleventh Amendment concerns,' Mansour, 474 U.S. at 474 U. S. 68, the interests in 'end[ing] a continuing violation of federal law,' ibid., outweigh the interests in state sovereignty and justify an award under § 1983 of an injunction that operates against the State's officers or even directly against the State itself. (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).

III. Notice

Notice is hereby given to all parties that this action is brought under F.R.C.P. Rule 65 seeking permanent preventive injunction and F.R.C.P. Rule 56 seeking summary judgment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of 14th Amendment rights to procedural due process. As this is an action brought against judicial officers, it is imperative to note that NO declaratory relief is available.

IV. Statement of Claim

A: The events giving rise to this complaint took place in Pinal County Superior Court, Pinal County Arizona.

B: The events giving rise to this complaint took place on or near May 3, 2012 and/or March 25, 2014 and continue to this day.

C: Four conditions exist that contribute to the denial of procedural due process to the Plaintiffs.

1: A judgment has been 'entered' on the docket (Docket Screen Shot 1, see Brief attachments) thereby rendering the delay of two and one half years: a postponement of the proceedings of the enforcement of that judgment. An "ordinary mode prescribed by law" exists (Hagar v. Reclamation Dist) to postpone the proceedings of the enforcement of a judgment, which constitutes due process that cannot be ignored by imposing a simple 'closure' and blocking any objection to it. F.R.C.P. Rule 62.

2: The court has 'closed' the case. An administrative closure is "a postponement of proceedings," rather than "a termination." S. La. Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, B.V., 383 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2004). Imposing a closing as a means of postponement, rather than the required stay, denies procedural due process to the Plaintiffs as that process is dictated to be a 'stay' in F.R.C.P. Rule 62.

3: The court has vacated all future hearings. The combination of closed and vacated hearings, denies procedural due process to the Plaintiffs.

4: There is no legal justification to postpone proceedings to enforce the existing judgment. There are no outstanding questions. There are no resources, hearings, requirements or any other case related informations pending or waiting to be presented. No motions under rules 50, 52, 59 exist in the case. Motion under rule 60 is the subject of the Special Action, which was mandated on March 10, 2014. No entry has ever been made in any order of the court expressly determining that there is no just reason for delay. There is no external related issue or case that has any bearing on the instant case in the Superior Court.

V. Irreparable Injury

Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable injuries through the imposition of the denial of the Plaintiffs' 14th Amendment rights of Due Process. The March 25, 2014 court order prohibiting any future hearings precludes asking that court for any reopening of the case or request that Rule 62 to followed properly. The court was moved for a default order with nothing served in response. The case is not related in any legal manner to any potential parallel criminal proceeding and cannot be legally withheld. The lack of a proper stay of the case, with its corresponding rights to notice, objection and appeal cannot be undone and is irreparable. That delay has meant Superior Court defendants have dissipated assets, sold assets, redistributed assets and have gravely reduced the ability to collect a judgment (the case IS a default, see Docket Screem Shot 2, brief attachments) with each day adding to the degree of difficulty and additional cost of that task.

VI. Summary Judgment

As no material fact necessary to decide this motion can be disputed, and that based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and do hereby move the Court to enter Summary Judgment under F.R.C.P. Rule 56 in favor of the Plaintiffs for the violation of 14th Amendment procedural due process rights and in so doing, cause the issuance of the permanent preventive injunction to stop the ongoing deprivation of due process from all parties named herein.

VII. Relief

The Plaintiffs request the court to issue a permanent injunction ordering the Defendants to stop violating the Plaintiffs' 14th Amendment rights of procedural Due Process by issuing the existing adjudication and final order of the case without delay. It is impossible to go back and undue the refusal of the court to grant Plaintiffs the right to imposition of Rule 62's stay, and its right to object to any stay and appeal any stay, therefore all that can be done, is to stop that delay by issuing the entered judgment in the case and any final orders in the case and completing the over 5-year-old defaulted case. Plaintiffs further request that the court dismiss from this case any prosecutorial defendant deemed to not be involved in this matter. Plaintiffs afforded all parties the ability to not be included in this action if they were not involved. Not one responded. But that still requires any that may not be involved be dismissed from this action at the specific prosecutorial defendant's request and the court's discretion. We further ask that defendants equally share in reimbursing our court filing fees for this action.

VIII. Certification and Closing

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, by signing below, we certify to the best of our knowledge, information, and belief that this complaint: (1) is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) is supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Rule 11.

A: Pro Se Parties

We agree to provide the Clerk's Office with any changes to our address where case-related papers may be served. We understand that our failure to keep a current address on file with the Clerk's Office may result in the dismissal of our case.

Dated this 20th of September, 2016.

LEE HEMPFLING, Pro Se

APACHE JUNCTION, AZ 85120

SUESIE HEMPFLING, Pro Se

APACHE JUNCTION, AZ 85120




Lee & Suesie Hempfling, Pro Se
Apache Junction, AZ 85120

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LEE HEMPFLING &

SUESIE HEMPFLING ,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

M. Lando VOYLES ,

BOYD T. JOHNSON.

BRADLEY M. SOOS, (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

MARK BRNOVICH,

LORETTA LYNCH (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

Defendants

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Case No.: CV-16-3213-PHX-ESW

BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF THE PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR
PERMANENT
PREVENTIVE
INJUNCTION
AND
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT


TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................3

JURISDICTION.....................................................................................6

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................7

Material Facts as to Which There Is No Dispute..........................11

FACTS...............................................................................................12

ARGUMENT.......................................................................................18

I. ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSINGS...............................................18

II. F.R.C.P. RULE 62.................................................................22

III. PARALLEL CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.....................................23

IV. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS..........26

A. There is Strong Evidence The Plaintiffs' 14th

Amendment Due Process rights have been violated..........................26

B. Applicants Face Critical and Exigent Circumstances.....................27

IV. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED IRREPARABLE HARM.............27

V. DEFENDANTS WILL NOT BE IRREPARABLY HARMED.................28

VI. THE PUBLIC INTEREST FAVORS AN INJUNCTION.......................28

CONCLUSION....................................................................................29

ATTACHMENTS..................................................................................31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884)...................................................... 9

also American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 715 (5th Cir.2002)............... 20

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965)................................................................ 9, 10

Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)............................................................... 9

Cantrell v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 457 (10th Cir.1995).................................................................................................................................. 20

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978)......................................................................... 8

Corion Corp. v. Chen, 964 F.2d 55, 56-57 (1st Cir.1992).................................................... 18

DEES v. BILLY No. 03-16004. 394 F.3d 1290 (2005) 9th Circuit.................................... 14

Fla. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir.2001)...... 19

FSLIC v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1989).................................................. 24, 28

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972)....................................................................... 10

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972)................................................................................ 8

GEDDES v. UNITED FINANCIAL GROUP No. 75-1468. 559 F.2d 557 (1977)........... 22

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).................................................................... 9

Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1980) );................................................................................................................................................... 24

Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982)............................................................................. 9, 10

Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884) Id. at 708;..................... 9, 15, 16, 23

Hempfling et al v. Stanford et al 2:15-cv-02268-DJH.......................................................... 16

HEMPFLING v. DR. JOHN BIGLER, et al. 2 CA-SA 2013-0077 09/16/2013................ 13

HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS S-1100-CV-201102200......................... 7, 11, 12, 18

In re Arbitration Between Phila. Elec. Co. v. Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd., 845 F.Supp. 1026, 1028 (S.D.N.Y.1994);...................................................................................................................... 18

In the Matter of Edward J. Greenfield, a Justice of the Supreme Court, 76 N.Y.2d 293 (1990) 12

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-71 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring)............................................................................................................................... 10

Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995))...................... 25

Keating v. OTS, 45 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1995)................................................................ 24

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 473 U. S. 165 (1985).................................................... 6

Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir.1999)................. 18, 19

London v. Patterson, 463 F.2d at 98 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973)) 24

Mansour, 474 U.S. at 474 U. S. 68,............................................................................................ 6

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)................................................................. 8

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)...................................................................... 9

Mercer v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 132 F.R.D. 38, 38-39 (W.D.Pa.1990),8 aff'd, 931 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1991).................................................................................................................................. 18

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 433 U. S. 289 (1977)...................................................... 7

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 436 U. S. 690, n. 55 (1978) 6

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)........................................ 9

Nelson v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 1579 (2000)................................................................................. 8

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009)............................................................................. 22

Papasan, supra, at 478 U. S. 282................................................................................................. 6

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 465 U. S. 101 (1984).. 6

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984)........................................................................ 7

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 440 U. S. 337 (1979)............................................................ 7

Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996)................................................................ 9

Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1974)........................................................................ 9, 10

S. La. Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, B.V., 383 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2004). 14

United States v. One 1962 Ford Galaxie Sedan, 41 F.R.D. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y.1966)..... 23

Whitham v Hill English Court of King's Bench 1759........................................................... 12

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).................................................. 6

Statutes

14th Amendment....................................................................................... 6, 7, 10, 20, 22, 26, 29

42 U.S.C. § 1983.................................................................................................................... 6, 14

United States Code, Title 28, §476(a)(3)................................................................................ 13

Other Authorities

American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2004, Canon 3(8).............. 12

Article 2 Section 11 of the Arizona Constitution................................................................... 22

Black's Law Dictionary............................................................................................................. 15

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)............................................................................... 8

Docket Screenshot 1............................................................................................... 11, 14, 19, 30

Docket Screenshot 2................................................................................................................... 11

Fifth Amendment....................................................................................................................... 25

Hempfling v. CVDC Holdings Order/Ruling March 25, 2014......................... 18, 27, 29, 31

http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/36-procedural-due-process-civil.html 7

http://www.cbs5az.com/story/22175618/pinal-co-superior-court-judge-johnson-announces-retirement................................................................................................................................................... 13

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/fact-sheet-prosecutorial-discretion........................................ 14

Jeffrey P. Handler letter...................................................................................................... 11, 17

Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).................................................... 7

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)...................................................................... 8

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)........................................ 8

October 2, 2013 Changed Ownership Canyon Vista Dental Care................................. 25, 40

OWNERSHIP IS DISPERSED......................................................................................... 25, 42

Roche Letter 1............................................................................................ 11, 16, 17, 19, 21, 33

Roche letter 2........................................................................................................................ 11, 34

United States Department of Justice........................................................................................ 14

Rules

F.R.C.P. Rule 56........................................................................................................................... 7

F.R.C.P. Rule 62............................................................................................... 15, 20, 22, 23, 24

F.R.C.P. Rule 65........................................................................................................................... 7

Rule 60......................................................................................................................................... 21

JURISDICTION

Federal Question in 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 14th Amendment Due Process Clause. In (Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) ) The United States Supreme Court stated: "An official-capacity suit is the typical way in which we have held States responsible for their duties under federal law." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 473 U. S. 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 436 U. S. 690, n. 55 (1978) ); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 465 U. S. 101 (1984) . "...although, prospective relief awarded against a state officer also 'implicate[s] Eleventh Amendment concerns,' Mansour, 474 U.S. at 474 U. S. 68, the interests in 'end[ing] a continuing violation of federal law,' ibid., outweigh the interests in state sovereignty and justify an award under § 1983 of an injunction that operates against the State's officers or even directly against the State itself. See, e.g., Papasan, supra, at 478 U. S. 282 ; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 440 U. S. 337 (1979) ; Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 433 U. S. 289 (1977) . As a general rule, absolute judicial immunity does not bar an award of prospective injunctive relief (Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) ).

INTRODUCTION

Under F.R.C.P. Rule 65, The Plaintiffs seek a permanent preventive injunction to stop the Defendants from violating their 14th Amendment rights to procedural Due Process and under F.R.C.P. Rule 56, do move the court for an entry of summary judgment, as the undisputed facts clearly and unequivocally point to no other outcome and no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and the movants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Such a discontinuation of the violation of Plaintiffs' procedural Due Process rights can only be accomplished with the valid release of the withheld judgment and orders and issuance of the final order in the case HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS S-1100-CV-201102200 Filed 6/6/2011 in the Pinal County Superior Court.

Due process (http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/36-procedural-due-process-civil.html) requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must be evenhanded, so that individuals are not subjected to the arbitrary exercise of government power (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894) ).

Although due process tolerates variances in procedure "appropriate to the nature of the case," (Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ) it is nonetheless possible to identify its core goals and requirements. First, "[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property."( Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) ) "[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases." (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) ) Thus, the required elements of due process are those that "minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations" by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests. (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) ) At times, the Court has also stressed the dignitary importance of procedural rights, the worth of being able to defend one's interests even if one cannot change the result. (Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) ; Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ; Nelson v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 1579 (2000) )

The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record. "Due process of law is [process which], following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884) Id. at 708; Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884) )

"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." (Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) . See also Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) ) "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard." (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863) ) The notice must be sufficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to prevent the deprivation of his interest. (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) ) Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to assure that the person to whom it is directed receives it. (Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) ; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1974) ; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) ) The notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) ; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1974) ; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) )

"The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment. The rules "minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations" by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests. (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) . See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-71 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring) ) The Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin Defendants' pattern & practice of violations of the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment.

On August 1, 2016 Plaintiffs sent letters to the parties named herein in a good faith effort, seeking to stop the violations of our rights and to resolve this issue without having to resort to federally legal and public proceedings. Again on August 17, 2016, Plaintiffs once again sent courtesy letters to the Defendants herein attempting to stay out of the expense and aggravation of federal legal action. Ample notice and opportunity were provided to all Defendants that they would not be included in this action if they only indicated they were not involved in this issue. Plaintiffs were willing to take their word for it. To this day, not one party named and afforded multiple opportunities has bothered to respond.

Material Facts as to Which There Is No Dispute

1. A judgment has been entered on the docket. The case is identified as 'adjudicated'. see Docket Screenshot 1.

2. A final order enforcing that judgment and properly disposing of the case has not issued. see Roche Letter 1.

3. That final order is 'not finished' and 'not signed', but it already exists. see Roche Letter 1.

4. The final order, dated March 25, 2014, will replace the current order filed 3/27/2014 and listed on the docket as March 25, 2014: when completed and signed. see Roche letter 2.

5. Plaintiffs in the Superior Court case (same Plaintiffs in this action) identified and repeatedly reported a crime or crimes within the office of the clerk of court, to both the witnessing deputy clerk and to the court.

6. There has been no public knowledge of prosecution of that crime or any crime originating inside the office of the clerk of court.

7. The case had not received a ruling or final order possibly because 'other processes' were holding it up. See Jeffrey P. Handler letter.

8. Defendants to Hempfling v CVDC Holdings were under notice that they had appeared improperly.

9. The crime or crimes at the beginning of the case resulted in the case being a default. see Docket Screenshot 2 showing the court refused to recognize counsel.

10. The crime or crimes at the beginning of the case involved documents that did not properly appear in the case as it had defaulted.

11. Without there being any relationship inside the case to the crime or crimes there is no relation to any criminal investigation thereof.

12. The victim of the crime or crimes is the state of Arizona.

13. The court has blocked issuance of the existing judgment by ignoring Rule 62's required stay under the conditions that exist.

FACTS

Plaintiffs are NOT alleging any question of judicial ethics or conduct: "a Judge's failure to promptly dispose of pending matters generally does not warrant 'judicial discipline but rather administrative correction'". (In the Matter of Edward J. Greenfield, a Justice of the Supreme Court, 76 N.Y.2d 293 (1990) ) Delay in issuing reasons for judgment has been recognized in the common law since time immemorial by the expression justice delayed is justice denied, most aptly put by Justice Willes of the English Court of King's Bench in the 1759 case Whitham v Hill: "Delaying justice and denying justice are considered as the same thing in the Magna Carta." (Whitham v Hill English Court of King's Bench 1759 ) But delay in issuing judgment, when the docket indicates the case is already adjudicated is not any tenant of common law. "A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly...." (American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2004, Canon 3(8) ) Even United States Code, Title 28, §476(a)(3) (United States Code, Title 28, §476(a)(3) ) finds reason to make public the names of judges who carry "cases that have not been terminated within three years after filing".

Hempfling v. CVDC Holdings LLC et.al. was filed June 2011 and is now in excess of 5 and a quarter years old. The case is not pending a judgment, it is pending a signed and issued final order imposing that judgment and that period is now 2 and 1/2 years from the date the case was improperly closed.

In the case, in 2012, the court was moved for a judgment of default. No valid ruling or order has been presented in regards to that motion. (See the entire record of the Special Action, presented unopposed to both the Appeals Court ( HEMPFLING v. DR. JOHN BIGLER, et al. 2 CA-SA 2013-0077 09/16/2013 ) and the Arizona Supreme Court. ) No defendant legally appeared in the case and only one attorney for multiple defendants was even listed as representing anybody. In other words, the court's own docketing practice indicates default. No defendant appeared in the Appeals Court special action and no defendant appeared in the Arizona Supreme Court special action. NO defendant has appeared. Therefore, no document submitted by any defendant has appeared, either. There is no reason why any judge would seek to delay a case especially a judge who knew he would retire from the bench before the case would be completed. (http://www.cbs5az.com/story/22175618/pinal-co-superior-court-judge-johnson-announces-retirement ) Judge Boyd T. Johnson announced his retirement to the press on May 06, 2013. Johnson had been removed from all civil cases On May 3, 2012 passing the case by administrative order to Judge Pro Tem Bradley M. Soos.

A judgment was 'entered' on the docket (Docket Screen Shot 1) thereby rendering the delay of two and one half years; a postponement of the proceedings of the enforcement of that judgment. A required mechanism exists, prescribed by the legislature, to postpone the proceedings of the enforcement of a judgment, which constitutes due process that cannot be ignored by imposing a simple 'closure' and blocking any objection to it. F.R.C.P. Rule 62. Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment. The proper mechanism to postpone the proceedings of the enforcement of a judgment, is a stay.

Rather than a stay and the constitutionally protected due process to notice, argument and appeal of it, the court has 'closed' the case. "An order administratively closing a case is a docket management tool that has no jurisdictional effect." DEES v. BILLY No. 03-16004. 394 F.3d 1290 (2005) 9th Circuit. An administrative closure is "a postponement of proceedings," rather than "a termination." S. La. Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, B.V., 383 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2004). The United States Department of Justice clarifies an administrative closing as "... an order by the court that removes the case from the court's calendar of hearings. ... it simply means you will have no further hearings unless you or DHS specifically ask the court to schedule a hearing." (https://www.justice.gov/eoir/fact-sheet-prosecutorial-discretion) Imposing a closing, which is a means of postponement, rather than the required stay, denies procedural due process to the Plaintiffs as that process is required to be a 'stay' in F.R.C.P. Rule 62.

The court has vacated all future hearings. Essentially, this order precludes the filing of any motion or request that would require a hearing or a decision based on the pleadings. Black's Law Dictionary defines 'hearing' as: "the arguments of the counsel for the parties upon the pleadings, or pleadings and proofs," i.e. the process required for a decision of the court after being moved. Since hearings can be conducted in both verbal and written form, the order prohibits the only parties with legal standing (Plaintiffs) to move the court to reopen the case. That includes seeking to reopen the case and protect Plaintiffs' security. The combination of closed and vacated hearings, denies procedural due process to the Plaintiffs.

Since it is most obvious that a highly respected jurist as Judge Johnson would never have knowingly improperly withheld a case, and neither would the likewise highly respected Judge Pro Tem Soos; then there is a source of the delay not affording the rights to Plaintiffs of Rule 62's "ordinary mode prescribed by law" (Hagar v. Reclamation Dist) where the use of a closure instead of the required stay is to withhold that source from public scrutiny.

Administrative closure is widely and primarily used in immigration proceedings. Courts have a right to place a case in administrative closure with the right conditions. Courts do not have a right to place a case in administrative closure, and order the only parties legally permitted to appear to not bother asking for a decision to reverse that, because any future hearings are vacated as there is an "ordinary mode prescribed by law" already establishing due process to handle such a delay (Hagar v. Reclamation Dist). Courts also, do not have the right to use that technique to make an end run around the due process of a stay which is what the closure and its blocked hearings prohibition amounts to.

The administrative closure is not for the purposes of dealing with an uncollectable debt. Courts across the nation have used administrative closure processes to manage their stale case problem through mass dismissal as a means to handle uncollectable debt. In the Superior court case there is no debt to collect as no final order has issued (Roche Letter 1). Plaintiffs were forced to file suit in this very Federal District (Hempfling et al v. Stanford et al 2:15-cv-02268-DJH ) regarding that issue when clerks determined the case 'closed' meant it was finished and debt was due. The outcome of Hempfling et al v. Stanford et al's final order is also pending at this time.

The administrative closure is not for the purposes of failure to amend any filings to conform to legal requirements. That, is commonly done in utility proceedings before the state commissions. There are no filings to be amended. There is only a single outstanding motion for default before the court. A judgement exists in the case and has been 'entered'. The final order imposing that judgment has not signed (Roche Letter 1).

The administrative closure is for the purposes of permitting some 'other processes' to take place that are not part of the Superior Court case. See Jeffrey P. Handler Letter.

The most obvious source of other processes is a prosecutorial entity, such as the Pinal County Attorney, the Arizona Attorney General, or the United States Attorney General. Plaintiffs became whistleblowers and uncovered and reported the commission of a crime or crimes inside the state's office of the Clerk of Court.

That crime or crimes was committed in the act of withholding documents from the official court docket. Plaintiffs discovered that crime and reported it to a deputy clerk in the Apache Junction satellite office of the clerk of court. The court's reaction to learning of the crime or crimes was to keep counsel for the majority of the defendants off of the official docket. The missing documents were found and placed in the docket four days after the deputy clerk witnessed they were not entered on the official docket (10 days after the date to respond had passed). The very nature of the crime or crimes and the non-appearance of counsel are compelling empirical evidence to indicate that the commission of that crime or crimes is not in any way related to the medical malpractice case no defendant appeared to defend, and the case is a default.

ARGUMENT

The case Hempfling v CVDC Holdings has been withheld, essentially stayed and concealed for nearly two and one half years since any activity seeking a decision by the Plaintiffs was prohibited by court order closing the case and vacating all future hearings (Hempfling v. CVDC Holdings Order/Ruling March 25, 2014 ).

1. ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSING

In Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir.1999) the court explained: "Administrative closings comprise a familiar, albeit essentially ad hoc, way in which courts remove cases from their active files without making any final adjudication." See Corion Corp. v. Chen, 964 F.2d 55, 56-57 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that an order deeming a case "administratively closed" was not a final, appealable order absent a separate document to signal the court's "view that the case had concluded"). The method is used in various districts throughout the nation in order to shelve pending, but dormant, cases. See, e.g., id.; In re Arbitration Between Phila. Elec. Co. v. Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd., 845 F.Supp. 1026, 1028 (S.D.N.Y.1994); Mercer v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 132 F.R.D. 38, 38-39 (W.D.Pa.1990),8 aff'd, 931 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1991). The case in question here is known to already have a final adjudication just lacking signature on the final order imposing it (see Roche Letter 1). ("an order merely directing that a case be marked closed constitutes an administrative closing that has no legal consequence other than to remove that case from the district court's active docket"); Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir.1999) ("an administrative closing has no effect other than to remove a case from the court's active docket and permit the transfer of records associated with the case to an appropriate storage repository"); Fla. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (endorsing the Lehman court's definition of an administrative closing).

Here, there IS a final adjudication. It is entered into the clerk's docket (see Docket Screenshot 1). That makes the use of the administrative closing an improper replacement for the more appropriate stay required by Rule 62, without affording the constitutional rights to notice, argument and appeal a stay brings with it. Since the order closing the case is a 'draft' of the already existing final order (see Roche Letter 1), and itself is file stamped by the clerk, dated two days after its entry on the docket. It is valid in regards to vacating future hearings and closing the case, with the only trigger to reopen the case residing with the judge as when the final order is signed, yet it is not 'official' (see Roche Second Letter). It might be valid until it is replaced, but that act constitutes imposing a postponement outside of the mechanism created by congress for a stay and it deprives the Plaintiffs' of their 14th Amendment rights to procedural due process established by Rule 62.

Lehman's view of administrative closings has been followed by the Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Florida Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) ("Designating a case `closed' does not prevent the court from reactivating a case either of its own accord or at the request of the parties."); (The instant case is solely at the court's decision) Cantrell v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 457 (10th Cir.1995) ; see also American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 715 (5th Cir.2002) What prohibits the request for reactivating the case is the declaration vacating all future hearings.

The Superior Court cannot use an administrative closing, to ignore Rule 62.

With the Superior Court case 'adjudicated', according to F.R.C.P. Rule 62. Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment: (a) "no execution may issue on a judgment, nor may proceedings be taken to enforce it, until 14 days have passed after its entry."[ This delay is 2 and one half years.] (b) "On appropriate terms for the opposing party's security, the court may stay the execution of a judgment-or any proceedings to enforce it-pending disposition of any of the following motions: (1) under Rule 50, for judgment as a matter of law; (2) under Rule 52(b), to amend the findings or for additional findings; (3) under Rule 59, for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment; or (4) under Rule 60, for relief from a judgment or order." [ No motions under rules 50, 52, 59 exist in the case. Motion under rule 60 is the subject of the Special Action, which was mandated on March 10, 2014.] "...appropriate terms for the opposing party's security" is what this motion for summary judgment and preventive injunction is all about! (h) "Stay with Multiple Claims or Parties. A court may stay the enforcement of a final judgment entered under Rule 54(b) until it enters a later judgment or judgments, and may prescribe terms necessary to secure the benefit of the stayed judgment for the party in whose favor it was entered." [judgment is already entered] Rule 54(b) "when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." No entry has ever been made in any order of the court expressly determining that there is no just reason for delay. Under Rule 54(b)(a) "Definition; Form. 'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies," The unserved judgment of the court cannot be appealed. The final order imposing that judgment is not signed. See Roche Letter 1.

According to rule 62 a stay is the single method available to the court to delay enforcing a judgment. An administrative closure cannot comply with rule 62 and violates the Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights under the 14th Amendment. By not using the required Rule 62 to improperly postpone the case the use of the closing meant justice was not administered openly. It further caused a great amount of unnecessary delay. "Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." (Article 2 Section 11 of the Arizona Constitution guarantees open justice.) "A stay is not a matter of right." (Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) )

2. F.R.C.P. Rule 62

Rule 62 is the controlling legal authority for a postponement of the enforcement of a judgment. Even if it had been properly recognized as the controlling legal authority and issued as a stay, the court is not awaiting any new information, is not pending from an appeal, is not affected by any external event that is related to the case and such use of Rule 62 would have been an abuse of discretion. Refusal to follow Rule 62 to impose an administrative closure on the case to facilitate a postponement is likewise an abuse of discretion.

In GEDDES v. UNITED FINANCIAL GROUP No. 75-1468. 559 F.2d 557 (1977) Ninth Circuit; the court had stayed a case using Rule 62: "Rule 62 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is very explicit concerning the protection afforded to litigants who seek a stay at various stages of the proceedings. The presence of such comprehensive protection implies the absence of such power in time periods not covered by the Rules. United States v. One 1962 Ford Galaxie Sedan, 41 F.R.D. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y.1966). See 7 Moore, Federal Practice 62.03, at 62-13 & 62-14 (1975). The trial court here made no attempt to justify its stays by any of the provisions of Rule 62. Indeed, it is clear that executions on the judgments were stayed as accommodations to appellees after the court had examined their abilities to pay the judgments. Given this reason for its action, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the stays."

PARALLEL CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

Given the circumstances surrounding the beginning of the case in Superior Court a prudent and legally knowledgeable person would assume a parallel criminal proceeding was responsible for the withholding of the case and the failure to issue a final order in an 'adjudicated' case was due to a stay to deal with that criminal proceeding. Yet in this instance there is no stay. There is an improperly imposed postponement in violation of the "ordinary mode prescribed by law" (Hagar v. Reclamation Dist).

Had the Superior Court properly followed the requirements of Rule 62, the Ninth Circuit has held a postponement of civil proceedings until the conclusion of a related criminal investigation is the preferred alternative to the dilemma facing defendants in parallel cases (London v. Patterson, 463 F.2d at 98 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973)) ) . The issue of the effect on Plaintiffs is completely different, especially when the civil proceedings are not at all related to the criminal proceedings.

A criminal case that is not at all related to the cause of the civil case, who's actors are not the same, where there is not even one document that connects the two because all documents were in default and never appeared, cannot preclude the civil case from being completed as it is not related.

Had the authority requesting the case be postponed had to face Rule 62's requirements, relatively few decisions have declined to stay civil proceedings because of significant prejudice to plaintiffs, although in the instant case Plaintiffs have not been afforded the opportunity to object (FSLIC v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ); accord Keating v. OTS, 45 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1995) ) .

In Molinaro, supra, 889 F.2d at 903 the denial of stay was upheld because the defendant was dissipating assets and potentially depriving the government of recovery. The government does not enjoy any greater rights than citizen plaintiffs. Defendants in this civil action dissipated assets, sold assets, hid assets and distributed assets in alleged illegal acts of potential fraud, on or right after the same date the Appeals Court sent its decision to the Superior Court in the Special Action. See OWNERSHIP IS DISPERSED . Ownership of the main company was transferred on the very day the Appeals Court sent its decision to the Superior Court. See October 2, 2013 Changed Ownership Canyon Vista Dental Care . One defendant fled to Alaska two years, 6 months ago, near the same time as the issuance of the Appeals' Court Mandate of the Special Action. He still works there as a practicing Dentist.

Arguing against such a stay, the parties are not the same. The victim of the criminal act or acts inside the clerk's office, is the State of Arizona: as it is a state office. Plaintiffs in the civil case are not at all involved in the criminal issue other than whistleblowers in having uncovered and reported the incidents. That can only mean that Plaintiffs' civil case being withheld is NOT related to any criminal case potentially arising out of the criminal act or acts.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated (Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995)) that the district court acted within its discretion in denying a stay premised on the defendant's parallel criminal proceedings because the defendant failed to demonstrate that his Fifth Amendment rights would be implicated by amendment of the judgment. "In the absence of substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, simultaneous parallel civil and criminal proceedings are unobjectionable under our jurisprudence. . . .") (citation and alterations omitted). There certainly is NO absence of substantial prejudice to the Plaintiffs and there is NO stay issued, nor had there been any due process to argue against such stay had there been one.

III. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS

A. There is Strong Evidence the Plaintiffs' 14th Amendment Due Process rights have been violated.

As clearly indicated in the undisputed facts, the conditions existing point to a clear and definitive violation of procedural due process that continues each day it is not stopped. There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. The facts of the events and actions involving the default through the commission of a crime or crimes is clearly and definitively indicative of no relationship between the crime and the withheld case. Since a petition for a preliminary injunction (resulting in the stoppage of the violation of Plaintiffs' due process right) would amount to a permanent injunction (as only the issuance of the final ruling and order in the Superior court case could satisfy the cessation of violation) it is appropriate that Plaintiffs move the court for a determination of Summary Judgment based on the undisputed facts and issuance of a permanent preventive injunction.

B. All indications in the Superior Court point to the existence of a default.

Plaintiff's likelihood of an order in Plaintiffs' favor from the Superior Court are 100%.

C. Applicants Face Critical and Exigent Circumstances.

The ability to recover any amount awarded from the default of the Superior Court case decreases with every day that passes. Plaintiffs will incur substantial cost and expense in hiring counsel to seek recovery of assets. Any interest accruing from the date of the judgment will be moot when nothing is collectable due to delay. Those assets have been muddled by the obvious belief of Defendants in the Hempfling v CVDC case in March of 2014 that they would be shortly served with a default order. Thereby resulting in the rushed hiding and disbursement of assets. Furthermore, the Pinal County Attorney, having lost the bid for reelection will be leaving office at the end of the year. It will be nearly impossible for the new County Attorney to come up to speed on any criminal proceedings and could very well decide not to pursue such proceedings leaving Plaintiffs in a condition of perpetual limbo.

IV. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED IRREPARABLE HARM

The refusal to issue the judgment of the Superior Court has resulted in the deprivation of property rights to the award that must be unchanged from the demand made in the original complaint, as no revisions can be made to the complaint filed in the Superior Court and the Plaintiffs must receive the relief demanded plus payment of Plaintiffs' filing costs. The ability to collect such award is dramatically hindered with each passing day. Molinaro, supra, 889 F.2d at 903

V. DEFENDANTS WILL NOT BE IRREPARABLY HARMED

The immediate stopping of Defendants' violating Plaintiffs' right to procedural due process through the issuance of judgment that already exists poses no harm to any defendant in this case. The release of a withheld civil case that is not in any way directly related to any criminal investigation or prosecution cannot harm any defendant in any case.

VI. THE PUBLIC INTEREST FAVORS AN INJUNCTION

The public interest strongly favors an injunction, because the public interest nearly always weighs in favor of protecting constitutional rights. If the Superior Court case is withheld for any reason to favor the public interest, to indeed weigh in favor of protecting the constitutional rights of an accused, (apparently confirmed by no prosecutor asking to be removed from this action) then there can be no potential of the case's delay being anything other than for that purpose and no criminal case relates to the civil case in question at all, violating procedural due process.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, case law references, source references, factual evidence and prevailing law: Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to enter Summary Judgment in Plaintiffs' favor in that defendants have and do continue to violate Plaintiffs' 14th Amendment rights to procedural due process, and to issue a permanent preventive injunction to all defendants to stop violating Plaintiffs' 14th Amendment rights to procedural due process by immediately issuing the judgment and final ruling and order of the case: Hempfling v CVDC Holdings.

This document is in 13pt type, double spaced.

We believe this document to be in compliance with local rules but we respectfully request that the court grant us permission to submit this document if it may exceed the count of pages indicated. We do not believe the pertinent parts do exceed any requirement. This issue simply cannot be explained in less.


Dated this 20th of September, 2016.

LEE HEMPFLING, Pro Se

APACHE JUNCTION, AZ 85120

SUESIE HEMPFLING, Pro Se

APACHE JUNCTION, AZ 85120


ATTACHMENTS - EXHIBITS

Docket Screenshot 1

(Red line was drawn by Lynn Hurley, former Chief Deputy Clerk of Pinal County Superior Court when she sent this screen shot of the court's clerk docket.)


Hempfling v. CVDC Holdings Order/Ruling March 25, 2014

Roche Letter 1


Roche Letter 2

I understand. I'll let you know something as soon as I can.

Chad A Roche

Clerk of the Superior Court

Pinal County

________________________________________

From: Suesie Hempfling

Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 2:09 PM

To: Roche, Chad

Subject: Re: Mr. Roche

Thank you for your email.

I know it's been almost 9 months & we still haven't received any final

orders. I have no clue what the reason is behind the long wait and it is

extremely frustrating.

If the final order has not been issued (since we haven't received

anything at all...) would you please tell me... and if you can, please

tell me why. It would relieve a lot of stress & since my health isn't

the greatest, that relief would go a long way.

On 11/24/2014 12:41 PM, Roche, Chad wrote:

> Yes, drafts are deleted because they're not official. I'll check on the case again to see if any final orders have been issued. If they have, I'll email them to you.

>

>

> Chad A Roche

> Clerk of the Superior Court

> Pinal County

> ________________________________________

> From: Suesie Hempfling

> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 10:58 AM

> To: Roche, Chad

> Subject: Mr. Roche

>

> Mr. Roche,

> I haven't written to you before but now I feel the need for an answer to my question/concerns.

> You stated on April 2nd, 2014: "Once the final order is completed and signed the draft will be deleted and replaced with the actual order. "

> Is this true? Also, will I ever be receiving the final order from this court?

>

>

> Reference:

> HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS

> S-1100-CV-201102200

>

> Suesie Hempfling ________________________________________

From: Suesie Hempfling

Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 2:09 PM

To: Roche, Chad

Subject: Re: Mr. Roche

Thank you for your email.

I know it's been almost 9 months & we still haven't received any final

orders. I have no clue what the reason is behind the long wait and it is

extremely frustrating.

If the final order has not been issued (since we haven't received

anything at all...) would you please tell me... and if you can, please

tell me why. It would relieve a lot of stress & since my health isn't

the greatest, that relief would go a long way.

On 11/24/2014 12:41 PM, Roche, Chad wrote:

> Yes, drafts are deleted because they're not official. I'll check on the case again to see if any final orders have been issued. If they have, I'll email them to you.

>

>

> Chad A Roche

> Clerk of the Superior Court

> Pinal County

> ________________________________________

> From: Suesie Hempfling

> Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2014 10:58 AM

> To: Roche, Chad

> Subject: Mr. Roche

>

> Mr. Roche,

> I haven't written to you before but now I feel the need for an answer to my question/concerns.

> You stated on April 2nd, 2014: "Once the final order is completed and signed the draft will be deleted and replaced with the actual order. "

> Is this true? Also, will I ever be receiving the final order from this court?

>

>

> Reference:

> HEMPFLING vs CVDC HOLDINGS

> S-1100-CV-201102200

>

> Suesie Hempfling


Docket Screenshot 2

Jeffrey P. Handler Letter


CVD CARE CHANGED HANDS AFTER BEING SERVED THE LAW SUIT

October 2, 2013 Changed Ownership Canyon Vista Dental Care

OWNERSHIP IS DISPERSED

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

INJUNCTION FILED IN FEDERAL COURT AGAINST LANDO VOYLES, MARK BRNOVICH, LORETTA LYNCH (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED) AND TWO PINAL COUNTY JUDGES (FORMER JUDGE SOOS VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED)

Apache Junction, Arizona September 26, 2016

A preventive injunction CV-16-3213-PHX-ESW has been filed in Federal Court to stop the Pinal County Superior Court and county, state and federal prosecutorial agencies for violation of 14th Amendment rights to procedural due process prohibiting the release of a malpractice case.

______________________________________

Should the time come that you are severely and permanently injured or disfigured in a massively serious medical or dental malpractice incident in Arizona: let us hope you are independently wealthy.

In Arizona, after being injured, after spending thousands upon thousands of dollars of debt in medical care, emergency room care and highly expensive drugs that only treat the symptoms, you better have at least $15,000 set aside to pay for an expert witness or you will never receive legal counsel.

In Arizona, without an expert witness (you will have to acquire from out of state, none in state will go up against their peers) no lawyer will take your case. They cannot win it. If they cannot win they will not fight. The law is set up to protect the medical practitioner at every stage of litigation from the malpractice board of oversight to the state courts. Even though the Arizona Constitution prohibits any restrictions on what a victim can receive for medical malpractice, the law places a total restriction at the start of any such case. Either you can afford that out of state expert, or you can bend over and take it up the tail pipe; on top of whatever devastating and debilitating injury you may have experienced.

You'd be better off being run over by a bankrupt trucker than you would being injured by people who take oaths NOT to cause injury.

If you are able, and not intimidated by courts and the law, nor of evil defense attorneys; you could take the case yourself. Unless you are completely confident in your ability to understand MORE than just the court's rules and the law as it is written, mortgage your house and hire an attorney by the hour. Don't forget to get that expert witness money.

Don't own a house? Take the case yourself only if you understand what court really is. Take the case yourself only if you will never react to a defense move. Courts like to present the image of being governed by the rules of civil procedure. Sure, they exist and they pretty much control everything. But for what one rule says, what it does not say is more of what you will face in court. Do expect to face lies, false claims, misdirected responses, convoluted explanations, misquotes of laws and rules, late filings, made up versions of your own story. Expect them all and more.

No one ever expects to file a case in Superior Court and immediately have to deal with a felony. That is what happened when the dental malpractice case Hempfling v CVDC Holdings LLC et.al. was just underway in Pinal County, Arizona. The Hempflings took the case on their own and filed suit against five companies, a list of dentists and a managing member of those companies who was not a dentist.

Defense counsel for the defendants sent pages and pages and pages of questions out of order, in violation of discovery and they sent their responses to the Hempflings within the time limit for response. But. They did not counter sue. There was enough aggravating information in the complaint that should have infuriated the defendants (but not inflammatory) that a counter suit was expected and in most cases is required. But they did not file one. Something was not right.

When the time came for the Pinal County Clerk's Office to update their docket to show receipt and filing of those responses, nothing was there. The Hempflings waited ten days after that time had expired to respond. Upon requesting a deputy clerk in the Apache Junction field office of the court clerk to check on the status of the responses (in person) she was dumbfounded. "I wonder why they did that," she asked. Nothing was on the docket. Two different law firms, two sets of different attorneys for each firm, submitting two responses on two different days, handled by two different deputy clerks in the Florence office (one sent to the judge's chambers directly) and not one was on the docket. A document that is not on the docket does not exist in the case. It is invalid, just as if it had never been sent to the clerk.

In this instance, after reporting what was obviously an intentional withholding of documents from the court docket, the Hempflings showed the deputy clerk the documents received in the mail. Her reply was that those papers were trash. Nothing was on the docket. If the documents had been sent to the clerk at all somebody had managed to withhold them. If they had been sent at all. Four days later, the documents showed up on the docket. Such time was well past the rules' grace period for missing a filing deadline. Somebody had managed to in some way get two different deputy clerks in the Florence Court Clerk's office to file stamp documents when they were received and then conveniently fail to enter them on the docket. What difference would that make?

In the court's rules is the process for a clerk's default. It is the procedure when a responding party fails to answer the complaint: a clerk witnesses such lack of appearance and upon request of the Plaintiffs issues an entry of default. That is followed by a default hearing after the defendants would have ridiculed and attacked the Plaintiffs for misusing the court. The Hempflings did not ask the clerk to make that entry. Had that entry been made, whomever had been convinced in the clerk's office that hiding a document from the docket was a good idea would have simply placed the documents on the docket on the days they were already time stamped and it would have appeared as if nothing ever happened. It would have made the required default hearing into a judge's tirade; an onslaught of denunciation, condemnation, censure, criticism and tongue-lashing against the Hempflings for having filed a default when no condition warranted a default for all defendants. The one defendant who literally never even bothered to recognize the court's summons (who's failing to appear did not require a felony) (that managing member of companies who was not a dentist, but was the wife of the primary dentist) would have been the single defaulted defendant the judge could see did not appear. The end result would not have been pretty. The Hempflings would have had an angry judge and the case would have been thrown out, even without reaching that expert witness.

But that is not what happened. The complaint was aggravating. It was quite strong and rather scary if one would read it closely. It demanded a dollar figure as compensatory damages when in Arizona the rule says you can't ask for any dollar amount in a malpractice law suit: a rule that flat out violates the state Constitution in that it prohibits asking for money at all when the Constitution prohibits the capping of any compensation. And in the great catch-22 of all time, failing to ask for a dollar amount means even winning by default the Plaintiffs could not be awarded a penny. Luckily, and this applies whether the court wants it to or not, it is prohibited for the judge to change a single thing of the complaint that is in default. That applies even if it violates a precious rule meant to protect bad and corrupt medical practitioners. The complaint demanded $5,000,000.00 PER DEFENDANT. The court has counted a total of 14 defendants. THIS IS A DEFAULT LAW SUIT FOR $70,000,000.00. That's SEVENTY MILLION DOLLARS; PLUS up to FOUR AND ONE HALF YEARS OF INTEREST (44-1201) calculated at the prime rate on May 2012 of 3.25% plus 1%. 4.25% of 70 million dollars up until the date of the injunction filing will bring the value of the complaint to over $83,000,000.00. And there is nothing anybody can do about it.

Instead of filing a counter suit, somebody committed a felony. Now, in most instances you would read that as 'somebody is alleged to have committed a felony'. Not here. A felony took place. Whether the act of withholding a filed document was a criminal interference in a judicial proceeding, or a bribe or both or worse doesn't matter. It is still a felony.

And that is where the case has sat ever since. Yes, many documents were filed, many motions made, none from the Defendants are valid as no one ever appeared in the case. In fact, the court did not recognize anyone appearing after those missing responsive documents found their way to the docket. Out of the court's count of 14 defendants only one had counsel in the case.

Eventually, after months of playing court and the Hempflings having managed to insert their evidence into the case for discovery, the Hempflings properly informed all Defendants they were not appearing properly and that ended their appearing at all. Except for one small filing the court did permit on the docket no defendant has filed a thing since. Even when the Hempflings took the case in a special action to the Arizona Appeals Court and then to the Arizona Supreme Court not one defendant appeared to argue against anything filed.

The case is a default due to the commission of a felony in the clerk's office. The victim of that crime was the state of Arizona (the court clerk is a state office.) Nothing appearing on the docket made it legally from the defendants so nothing withheld in that crime ever became part of the Hempfling case. That simply means there is no relationship between the crime and the Hempfling's case.

Then, sometime between when the Sheriff's office would have been notified by the Clerk of the Court that it had been the victim of a crime and the time when some prosecutor had decided it was going to take a long time to bring it all to trial, somebody asked the judge to stop the case. Perhaps it was their misbelief that releasing it would violate the 5th amendment rights of some accused person. Perhaps it was just too much bother to mess with. Regardless what the reason was the case was abruptly stopped after the Appeals Count mandated the Special Action. It stopped on March 25, 2014.

Here we are over two and one half years later. The court has entered a judgment on the docket. That means the Rules of Civil Procedure take control and limit the ability of the court to stop or hold or stay the case except under Rule 62. But that is not what the court did. It simply stopped the case. It closed the case. And it issued an order prohibiting any future hearings. Actually it 'vacated' any future hearings. That meant the Hempflings' case was dead, with an entered judgment that had never been served to anyone in the case and they were prohibited by court order from asking that it be reopened, as that would have required a hearing.

That violation of 14th Amendment rights to procedural due process is the subject of a federal complaint for a preventive injunction to stop the Pinal County Superior Court judges and the prosecutorial agency or agencies responsible for stopping the case from any further violation of the Hempflings' rights. The Injunction and Summary Judgment CV-16-3213-PHX-ESW was filed September 21, 2016 in Arizona District Court against Judge Boyd T. Johnson, retired; Judge Pro Tem Bradley Soos (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED), Pinal County Attorney M. Lando Voyles, Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich and United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch (VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED).

A case that started with the Defendants not appearing, sits with the court prohibiting the Plaintiffs from appearing.

The Injunction and the detailed brief in support of it are available for public view at http://pinalcountyjustice.com .


INITIAL PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DOES PINAL FINALLY HAVE AN "UNTOUCHABLE" COUNTY ATTORNEY?

Apache Junction, Arizona August 17, 2016

In 1930 The Chicago Tribune referred to the newly appointed Prohibition agent for the U.S. Attorney's office as 'untouchable'. The title stuck, as Elliot Ness formed a team of untouchables to go after Al Capone. In the 1960's the term was the title of a television series starring Robert Stack.

To be "untouchable", not able or allowing to be touched or affected, is one of the highest ethical conditions a person with serious responsibility can enjoy. It is truly a badge of honor.

That term, is not one readily associated with Pinal County, Arizona. Pinal County has a history of being corrupt. Arizona itself is the current first place winner in the illegal corruption [1] ratings of the country [2] . The Harvard study found, under Illegal Corruption in America that "Arizona is perceived to be the most corrupt state with legislative and executive branches both scoring 4". Arizona's score for Illegal Judicial corruption was a 2: "even a score of 2 is still worrying since it is the judicial branch of the government that is supposed to try and convict the corrupt officials." Even Arizona's Legal Bar is corrupt [3].

Last election cycle, Pinal County was offered an alternative to the Democrat controlled attorney's office. After a long hard fight, with accusations flying in all directions the people of the county voted for Michael Lando Voyles to replace Jim Walsh. Lando, as Voyles prefers to be called, got to work even before he was sworn in.

Voyles' original pledge to "Send Violent Offenders to Prison; Stop Traffickers and Smugglers; Support Victims' Rights" has been met with complaints from politicians with potentially nefarious motivations that putting people in prison costs too much. Seeking the death penalty for serious capital crimes costs too much. The people did not elect Voyles because he was going to reduce the cost of putting the bad guys out of society, they elected him to do just that. For the criminals who have been arrested, he has done so.

Voyles claims a "97.64 percent conviction rate that keeps the most dangerous criminals behind bars. This hadn't happened previously and is a large factor in violent crime rates decreasing in our communities." [4]

His pledge to support victim's rights gave birth to the Pinal County Family Advocacy Center where the investigation into abuse crimes against children have been streamlined down with far less trauma to the child. According to Voyles, what used to take 12 interviews and six months, now only takes 1 interview and 1 day. His office is now collecting evidence from all victims, instead of just a few. A major accomplishment.

His pledge to stop traffickers and smugglers grew into his leading the way in programs to curtail and treat domestic violence, to stop human trafficking by helping to train first responders and others to deal with the huge problem exploited by the Mexican drug cartels. He increased focus on victim's services and started a citizen's academy to help train interested persons in the way justice is provided in the county.

Voyle's says, "Our anti-human trafficking coalition, Pinal County Rescue and Restore is in its third year of creating awareness, helping trafficking victims, and restoring hope thanks to a grant from the Department of Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. PCRR consists of law enforcement representatives, first responders, PCAO Family Advocacy Staff and Deputy County Attorneys, outreach providers, and religious organizations, among many others. With the grant monies, we provide outreach, public awareness, and conduct trainings to help with our mission of rescuing and restoring foreign victims of human trafficking." [5]

He has stood up to bullying politicians more concerned with making points than a safe county. And he has stood up to the Pinal County Press. Let no one be fooled, Pinal County is deeply corrupted Democrats running as Republicans, attacking elected officials, owning the press, even under false banners and 'conservative' headers. There is not one real non-liberal press outlet in the county.

And Voyles has been the target of that democrat machine ever since he challenged Jim Walsh for the county attorney's job.

"Pinal County Clerk of Courts Office employees tell us he has literally upset the apple cart in the Clerk of Courts Office with frivolous cases! Not to mention revenge cases for Sheriff Paul Babeu!" [6] The county clerk of court's office is the farthest from believable as any other totally corrupted enterprise can be. Although the current Clerk of Court was sued for pretending to have the powers of a judge she now apparently also declares whether a case is frivolous or based in revenge. A reprehensible conduct.

Voyles' opponent in this month's Republican primary race is Kent Volkmer. Volkmer is with the Wallace, Volkmer & Weagant PLLC Law Office of Casa Grande and currently the President of the Pinal County Bar. While Volkmer likes to point to pinal county press misleading studies [7] for his financial attacks. Voyles answered on his campaign webpage; "False claims have said prosecution has cost the county $5-6 million more per year. The truth is that for the past three years, the Board of Supervisors increased the entire county spending by only $3 million; that only went to county raises of $2.2 million and approximately $1 million in debt services. None of that money came to the Pinal County Attorney's Office general fund budget."

Volkmer's background is in "Juvenile Law, both Delinquency and Dependency, Family Law, Guardianships and Conservatorships, Probate, Wills, Estate Planning and Criminal Law" [8] none as prosecutor; while Voyles' background is "Prosecutor in 80+ Felony Jury Trials with 8 and 12 Member Juries, and Numerous Misdemeanor Jury and Bench Trials; Litigated 30+ Probable Cause (Preliminary) Hearings and Several Probation Violation Hearings; Presented approximately 100+ Grand Jury Hearings" among many others. [9]

So it is no wonder that Lee and Suesie Hempfling of Apache Junction, AZ, both conservative Republicans, supported Voyles for county attorney in 2012 following their filing a civil case in the Pinal County Superior Court in August of 2011 and the crime or crimes committed inside the clerk of court's office shortly thereafter intended to 'fix' that case. The court was notified of the attempted 'fix' in official court documents. A deputy clerk witnessed the results and wondered why it was done that way. But nothing came of it.

The case proceeded without defense counsel appearing properly (the court never recognized counsel for the majority of the defendants) and moved through an unanswered motion for default, to no activity. After a long series of documents culminating in a Special Action to the Appeals Court and the Arizona Supreme Court the case came to an abrupt halt without a single valid, legal order, except the one stopping all hearings.

It has been in that condition of stay for nearly two and one half years.

The court would have no logical or legal reason to withhold rulings. There was a crime or crimes committed in the clerk of court's office without prosecution. The newly elected clerk was a former Democrat operative who ran as a Republican and unseated the clerk who knew about the crime or crimes and would have been responsible for reporting them to the Sheriff. Once sworn in the newly elected clerk proceeded to openly attack the former clerk and County Attorney Voyles. One allegation she made was quashed after an investigation by the Administrative office of the Supreme Court. She, and her (now former) chief deputy had to be sued in Federal Court to stop their proclaiming the case was finished, when there is clearly no final order.

The real 'unknown' is whether the crime or crimes committed in the clerk's office (a state office) were ever investigated and whether if there was an investigation, whether that level of corruption was deeper and had been going on for years. (There had to be a reason why so many sealed case documents were viewed by so many people.) It would take time for that investigation to take place, if there was one.

There was no reason to withhold a medical malpractice case from completion without some compelling reason and some prosecutorial actor seeking to withhold it.

A County Attorney of such intent to do justice for the county would be just the right person to take control of a deep corruption probe and bring years of corruption to justice through what would amount to a parallel criminal case. Elliot Ness would have been proud. The problem there though, is that civil medical malpractice case the court refuses to complete is not able to be legally withheld for a criminal case completely outside of its participants, topics and focus.

The Hempflings kept inquiring about the civil case over the years and finally there just seemed to be no chance it was ever going to end, and their federal law suit against the sitting clerk of court and her former chief deputy had defaulted in the Hempflings' favor; as the state Attorney General's office refused to recognize the valid summons of the Federal Court. The only option was to step up and demand the case be released.

On August 1 of this year the Hempflings wrote a private letter to the responsible parties seeking to have their case released. That letter had nothing to do with the civil case itself. Perhaps it wasn't Voyles holding it up. Perhaps he did not do his job and did not even bother to look into crimes in the clerk's office. Perhaps the former County Attorney Jim Walsh had thrown the whole thing out? Perhaps the state was investigating. After all, the clerk's office is a state office of the Supreme Court. If the corruption was deep enough and the crime or crimes that took place in the court clerk's office were bribery, perhaps the federal attorney was holding it all up. There is no way to tell as not one potentially responsible party bothered to respond to the letter.

So now, the Hempflings have no other option. Considering the problems arise completely under federal law, they are not under any obligation to issue a notice of claim to the responsible parties and for all intents and purposes should immediately file a federal claim for emergency injunctive relief, as the court and the parties responsible for the withholding of the case are violating the Hempflings' constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

But in an attempt, to not have to, yet again, enter into the court system for this one single medical malpractice case; the Hempfling's have sent one final good will letter seeking to have their case released. An attempt to not have to incur yet further costs while only trying to receive a final order in a case that started FIVE YEARS AGO. A case that has never reached a final ruling that was legally instructed to be entered by the clerk. Both Chad Roche and the Appeals Court Clerk Jeffrey P. Handler had written that the case has never received its final order. Almost Two and One Half years after the case was halted, it is far past time for those responsible to stop violating the Hempfling's rights.

To read the second letter access http://pinalcountyjustice.com

If Lando Voyles is pursuing crimes inside the home county of corruption in the most corrupt state in the Union, his reelection should be assured.

At this point the Hempflings are withholding their early voting ballots.

Resources

  1. Harvard defines "illegal corruption as the private gains in the form of cash or gifts by a government official, in exchange for providing specific benefits to private individuals or groups. It is the form of corruption that attracts a great deal of public attention."
  2. http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-american-states-some-results-safra
  3. http://townhall.com/columnists/rachelalexander/2016/03/07/arizona-legislature-finally-about-to-dismantle-corrupt-arizona-bar-n2129834
  4. http://www.trivalleycentral.com/opinion/letters_to_editor/letter-to-the-editor-voyles-false-claims-on-county-attorney/article_ef1af42c-54de-11e6-b014-3b9308492df3.html#.V5uLc5RUOSw.facebook
  5. https://www.facebook.com/plugins/post.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FPinalCoAttorney%2Fposts%2F593510057485365&width=500
  6. http://www.arizonaconservativenews.com/2016/07/pinal-county-attorney-lando-voyles.html
  7. http://www.copamonitor.com/news/around_pinal/article_d9814aec-4842-11e6-991a-2b90fb8b5881.html
  8. http://www.wvwfirm.com/attorneys/kent-p-volkmer.html
  9. http://www.voyles4countyattorney.com/